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Abstract—The intrinsically secure communications graph
(iS-graph) is a random graph which captures the connections
that can be securely established over a large-scale network, in the
presence of eavesdroppers. It is based on principles of information-
theoretic security, widely accepted as the strictest notion of security.
In this paper, we are interested in characterizing the global
properties of the iS-graph in terms of percolation on the infinite
plane. We prove the existence of a phase transition in the Poisson
iS-graph, whereby an unbounded component of securely connected
nodes suddenly arises as we increase the density of legitimate nodes.
Our work shows that long-range communication in a wireless
network is still possible when a secrecy constraint is present.
Index Terms—Information-theoretic security, wireless networks,
stochastic geometry, percolation, connectivity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Percolation theory studies the existence of phase transitions in
random graphs, whereby an infinite cluster of connected nodes
suddenly arises as some system parameter is varied. Percolation
theory has been used to study connectivity of multi-hop wireless
networks, where the formation of an unbounded cluster is
desirable for communication over arbitrarily long distances.
Various percolation models have been considered in the
literature. The Poisson Boolean model was introduced in [1],
which derived the first bounds on the critical density, and started
the field of continuum percolation. The Poisson random con-
nection model was introduced and analyzed in [2]. The Poisson
nearest neighbour model was considered in [3]. The signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) model was characterized in
[4]. A comprehensive study of the various models and results in
continuum percolation can be found in [5]. Secrecy graphs were
introduced in [6] from an information-theoretic perspective, and
in [7] from a geometrical perspective. The local connectivity of
secrecy graphs was extensively characterized in [8], while the
scaling laws of the secrecy capacity were presented in [9]. The
effect of eavesdropper collusion on the secrecy properties was
studied in [10].
In this paper, we characterize long-range secure connec-
tivity in wireless networks by considering the intrinsically
secure communications graph (iS-graph), defined in [8]. The
iS-graph describes the connections that can be established with
information-theoretic security over a large-scale network. We
prove the existence of a phase transition in the Poisson iS-graph,
whereby an unbounded component of securely connected nodes
suddenly arises as we increase the density of legitimate nodes.
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In particular, we determine for which combinations of system
parameters does percolation occur. Our work shows that long-
range communication in a wireless network is still possible
when a secrecy constraint is present.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the
system model. Section III introduces various definitions. Sec-
tion IV presents the main theorem, whose underlying lemmas
are proved in Sections V and VI. Section VII provides additional
insights through numerical results. Section VIII presents some
concluding remarks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Wireless Propagation Characteristics
Given a transmitter node xi ∈ Rd and a receiver node xj ∈
R
d
, we model the received power Prx(xi, xj) associated with
the wireless link −−→xixj as
Prx(xi, xj) = P · g(xi, xj), (1)
where P is the transmit power, and g(xi, xj) is the power
gain of the link −−→xixj . The gain g(xi, xj) is considered con-
stant (quasi-static) throughout the use of the communications
channel, corresponding to channels with a large coherence time.
Furthermore, the function g is assumed to satisfy the following
conditions, which are typically observed in practice: i) g(xi, xj)
depends on xi and xj only through the link length |xi − xj |;1
ii) g(r) is continuous and strictly decreasing with r; and
iii) limr→∞ g(r) = 0.
B. iS-Graph
Consider a wireless network where the legitimate nodes and
the potential eavesdroppers are randomly scattered in space,
according to some point processes. The iS-graph is a conve-
nient representation of the links that can be established with
information-theoretic security on such a network.
Definition 2.1 (iS-Graph [8]): Let Πℓ = {xi} ⊂ Rd denote
the set of legitimate nodes, and Πe = {ei} ⊂ Rd denote the
set of eavesdroppers. The iS-graph is the directed graph G =
{Πℓ, E} with vertex set Πℓ and edge set
E = {−−→xixj : Rs(xi, xj) > ̺}, (2)
where ̺ is a threshold representing the prescribed infimum
secrecy rate for each communication link; and Rs(xi, xj) is the
maximum secrecy rate (MSR) of the link −−→xixj , given by
Rs(xi, xj) =
[
log2
(
1 +
Prx(xi, xj)
σ2ℓ
)
− log2
(
1 +
Prx(xi, e
∗)
σ2e
)]+
(3)
1With abuse of notation, we can write g(r) , g(xi, xj)||xi−xj |→r .
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Figure 1. Example of an iS-graph on R2.
in bits per complex dimension, where [x]+ = max{x, 0}; σ2ℓ , σ2e
are the noise powers of the legitimate users and eavesdroppers,
respectively; and e∗ = argmax
ek∈Πe
Prx(xi, ek).
2
In the remainder of the paper, we consider that the noise
powers of the legitimate users and eavesdroppers are equal,
i.e., σ2ℓ = σ2e = σ2. In such case, we can combine (1)-(3)
to obtain the following edge set
E =
{−−→xixj : g(|xi−xj |) > 2̺g(|xi−e∗|)+ σ2
P
(2̺−1)
}
, (4)
where e∗ = argmin
ek∈Πe
|xi − ek| is the eavesdropper closest to
the transmitter xi. The particular case of ̺ = 0 corresponds to
considering the existence of secure links, in the sense that an
edge −−→xixj is present iff Rs(xi, xj) > 0. In such case, the edge
set in (4) simplifies to
E =
{−−→xixj : |xi − xj | < |xi − e∗|, e∗ = argmin
ek∈Πe
|xi − ek|
}
.
Fig. 1 shows an example of such an iS-graph on R2.
The spatial location of the legitimate and eavesdropper nodes
can be modeled either deterministically or stochastically. In
many cases, the node positions are unknown to the network
designer a priori, so they may be treated as uniformly random
according to a Poisson point process [12]–[14].
Definition 2.2 (Poisson iS-Graph): The Poisson iS-graph is
an iS-graph where Πℓ,Πe ⊂ Rd are mutually independent,
homogeneous Poisson point processes with densities λℓ and λe,
respectively.
In the remainder of the paper (unless otherwise indicated),
we focus on Poisson iS-graphs in R2.
III. DEFINITIONS
Graphs: We use G = {Πℓ, E} to denote the (directed)
iS-graph with vertex set Πℓ and edge set given in (2).
In addition, we define two undirected graphs: the weak
iS-graph Gweak = {Πℓ, Eweak}, where
Eweak = {xixj : Rs(xi, xj) > ̺ ∨ Rs(xj , xi) > ̺},
and the strong iS-graph Gstrong = {Πℓ, Estrong}, where
Estrong = {xixj : Rs(xi, xj) > ̺ ∧ Rs(xj , xi) > ̺}.
2This definition uses strong secrecy as the condition for information-theoretic
security. See [8], [11] for more details.
Graph Components: We use the notation x G→ y to represent
a path from node x to node y in a directed graph G, and x G∗— y
to represent a path between node x and node y in an undirected
graph G∗. We define four components:
Kout(x) , {y ∈ Πℓ : ∃x G→ y}, (5)
Kin(x) , {y ∈ Πℓ : ∃ y G→x}, (6)
Kweak(x) , {y ∈ Πℓ : ∃x Gweak— y}, (7)
Kstrong(x) , {y ∈ Πℓ : ∃x Gstrong— y}. (8)
Percolation Probabilities: To study percolation in the
iS-graph, it is useful to define percolation probabilities asso-
ciated with the four graph components. Specifically, let pout∞ ,
pin∞, p
weak
∞ , and pstrong∞ respectively be the probabilities that the
in, out, weak, and strong components containing node x = 0
have an infinite number of nodes, i.e.,3
p⋄∞(λℓ, λe, ̺) , P{|K⋄(0)| =∞}
for ⋄ ∈ {out, in,weak, strong}.4 Our goal is to study the
properties and behavior of these percolation probabilities.
IV. MAIN RESULT
Typically, a continuum percolation model consists of an
underlying point process defined on the infinite plane, and a
rule that describes how connections are established between the
nodes [5]. A main property of all percolation models is that
they exhibit a phase transition as some continuous parameter
is varied. If this parameter is the density λ of nodes, then
the phase transition occurs at some critical density λc. When
λ < λc, denoted as the subcritical phase, all the clusters are a.s.
bounded.5 When λ > λc, denoted as the supercritical phase, the
graph exhibits a.s. an unbounded cluster of nodes, or in other
words, the graph percolates.
In this section, we aim to determine if percolation in the
iS-graph is possible, and if so, for which combinations of
system parameters (λℓ, λe, ̺) does it occur. The mathematical
characterization of the iS-graph presents two challenges: i) the
iS-graph is a directed graph, which leads to the study of
directed percolation; and ii) the iS-graph exhibits dependencies
between the state of different edges, which leads to the study
of dependent percolation. The result is given by the following
main theorem.
Theorem 4.1 (Phase Transition in the iS-Graph): For any
λe > 0 and ̺ satisfying
0 ≤ ̺ < ̺max , log2
(
1 +
P · g(0)
σ2
)
, (9)
there exist critical densities λoutc , λinc , λweakc , λstrongc satisfying
0 < λweakc ≤ λoutc ≤ λstrongc <∞ (10)
0 < λweakc ≤ λinc ≤ λstrongc <∞ (11)
3We condition on the event that a legitimate node is located at x = 0.
According to Slivnyak’s theorem [15, Sec. 4.4], apart from the given point at
x = 0, the probabilistic structure of the conditioned process is identical to that
of the original process.
4Except where otherwise indicated, we use the symbol ⋄ to represent the out,
in, weak, or strong component.
5We say that an event occurs “almost surely” (a.s.) if its probability is equal
to one.
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Figure 2. Auxiliary diagrams for proving Lemma 4.1.
such that
p⋄∞ = 0, for λℓ < λ⋄c , (12)
p⋄∞ > 0, for λℓ > λ⋄c , (13)
for any ⋄ ∈ {out, in,weak, strong}. Conversely, if ̺ > ̺max,
then p⋄∞ = 0 for any λℓ, λe.
To prove the theorem, we introduce the following three
lemmas.
Lemma 4.1: For any λe > 0 and ̺ satisfying (9), there exists
an ǫ > 0 such that pweak∞ (λℓ) = 0 for all λℓ < ǫ.
Proof: Postponed to Section V of the present paper.
Lemma 4.2: For any λe > 0 and ̺ satisfying (9), there exists
a ζ <∞ such that pstrong∞ (λℓ) > 0 for all λℓ > ζ.
Proof: Postponed to Section VI of the present paper.
Lemma 4.3: For any λe > 0 and ̺ ≥ 0, the percolation
probability p⋄∞(λℓ) is a non-decreasing function of λℓ.
Proof: This follows directly from a coupling argument. The
details can be found in [16].
With these lemmas we are now in condition to prove Theo-
rem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: We first show that if ̺ > ̺max, then
p⋄∞ = 0. The MSR Rs of a link −−→xixj , given in (3), is upper
bounded by the channel capacity R of a link with zero length,
i.e., Rs(xi, xj) ≤ R (xi, xi) = log2
(
1 + P ·g(0)σ2
)
. If the thresh-
old ̺ is set such that ̺ > ̺max, the condition Rs(xi, xj) > ̺ in
(2) for the existence of the edge −−→xixj is never satisfied by any
xi, xj . Thus, the iS-graph G has no edges and cannot percolate.
We now consider the case of 0 ≤ ̺ < ̺max. From the definitions
in (5)-(8), we have Kstrong(0) ⊆ Kout(0) ⊆ Kweak(0) and
Kstrong(0) ⊆ Kin(0) ⊆ Kweak(0), and therefore pstrong∞ ≤
pout∞ ≤ pweak∞ and pstrong∞ ≤ pin∞ ≤ pweak∞ . Then, Lemmas 4.1,
4.2, and 4.3 imply that each curve p⋄∞(λℓ) departs from the zero
value at some critical density λ⋄c , as expressed by (12) and (13).
Furthermore, these critical densities are nontrivial in the sense
that 0 < λ⋄c <∞. The ordering of the critical densities in (10)
and (11) follows from similar coupling arguments.
V. PROOF OF LEMMA 4.1
In this proof, it is sufficient to show that Gweak does not
percolate for sufficiently small λℓ in the case of ̺ = 0, since
for larger ̺ the connectivity is worse and Gweak certainly does
not percolate either.6
A. Mapping on a Lattice
We start with some definitions. Let Lh be an hexagonal lattice
as depicted in Fig. 2(a), where each face is a regular hexagon
with side length δ. Each face has a state, which can be either
open or closed. A set of faces (e.g., a path or a circuit) in Lh is
said to be open iff all the faces that form the set are open. We
now specify the state of a face based on how the processes Πℓ
and Πe behave inside that face.
Definition 5.1 (Closed Face in Lh): A face H in Lh is said
to be closed iff all the following conditions are met:
1) Each of the 6 equilateral triangles {Ti}6i=1 that compose
the hexagon H has at least one eavesdropper.
2) The hexagon H is free of legitimate nodes.
The above definition was chosen such that discrete face
percolation in Lh can be tied to continuum percolation in Gweak,
as given by the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1 (Circuit Coupling): If there exists a closed
circuit in Lh surrounding the origin, then the compo-
nent Kweak(0) is finite.
Proof: Assume there is a closed circuit C in Lh surrounding
the origin, as depicted in Fig. 2(b). This implies that the
open component in Lh containing 0, denoted by KLh(0), must
be finite. Since the area of the region KLh(0) is finite, the
continuous graph Gweak has a finite number of vertices falling
inside this region. Thus, to prove that Kweak(0) is finite, we
just need to show that no edges of Gweak cross the circuit C.
Consider Fig. 2(a), and suppose that the shaded faces are part
of the closed circuit C. Let x1, x2 be two legitimate nodes such
that x1 falls on an open face on the inner side of C, while x2
falls on the outer side of C. Clearly, the most favorable situation
for x1, x2 being able to establish an edge across C is the one
depicted in Fig. 2(a). The edge x1x2 exists in Gweak iff either
Bx1(δ) or Bx2(δ) are free of eavesdroppers.7 This condition
6A simple coupling argument shows that the percolation probabili-
ties p⋄∞(λℓ, λe, ̺) are non-increasing functions of ̺.
7We use Bx(ρ) , {y ∈ R2 : |y − x| ≤ ρ} to denote the closed two-
dimensional ball centered at point x, with radius ρ.
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Figure 3. Auxiliary diagrams for proving Lemma 4.2.
does not hold, since Definition 5.1 guarantees that at least one
eavesdropper is located inside the triangle Ti ⊂ Bx1(δ)∩Bx2(δ).
Thus, no edges of Gweak cross the circuit C, which implies that
Kweak(0) has finite size.
B. Discrete Percolation
Having performed an appropriate mapping from a continuous
to a discrete model, we now analyze discrete face percolation
in Lh.
Proposition 5.2 (Discrete Percolation in Lh): If the parame-
ters λℓ, λe, δ satisfy(
1− e−λe
√
3
4
δ2
)6
· e−λℓ 3
√
3
2
δ2 >
1
2
, (14)
then the origin is a.s. surrounded by a closed circuit in Lh.
Proof: The model introduced in Section V-A can be seen
as a face percolation model on the hexagonal lattice Lh, where
each face is closed independently of other faces with probability
p , P{face H of Lh is closed}
= P
{(
6∧
i=1
Πe{Ti} ≥ 1
)
∧Πℓ{H} = 0
}
=
(
1− e−λe
√
3
4
δ2
)6
· e−λℓ 3
√
3
2
δ2 . (15)
Face percolation on the hexagonal lattice can be equivalently
described as site percolation on the triangular lattice. In partic-
ular, recall that if
P{H is open} < 1
2
, (16)
then the open component in Lh containing the origin is a.s.
finite [17, Ch. 5, Thm. 8], and so the origin is a.s. surrounded
by a closed circuit in Lh. Combining (15) and (16), we obtain
(14).
We now use the propositions to finalize the proof of
Lemma 4.1, whereby pweak∞ (λℓ) = 0 for sufficiently small (but
nonzero) λℓ.
Proof of Lemma 4.1: For any fixed λe, it is easy to see
that condition (14) can always be met by making the hexagon
side δ large enough, and the density λℓ small enough (but
nonzero). For any such choice of parameters λℓ, λe, δ satisfying
(14), the origin is a.s. surrounded by a closed circuit in Lh (by
Proposition 5.2), and the component Kweak(0) is a.s. finite (by
Proposition 5.1), i.e., pweak∞ (λℓ) = 0.
VI. PROOF OF LEMMA 4.2
A. Mapping on a Lattice
We start with some definitions. Let Ls , d · Z2 be a square
lattice with edge length d. Let L′s , Ls +
(
d
2 ,
d
2
)
be the dual
lattice of Ls, depicted in Fig. 3(a). We make the origin of the
coordinate system coincide with a vertex of L′s. Each edge has a
state, which can be either open or closed. We declare an edge a′
in L′s to be open iff its dual edge a in Ls is open.
We now specify the state of an edge based on how the
processes Πℓ and Πe behave in the neighborhood of that edge.
Consider Fig. 3(b), where a denotes an edge in Ls, and S1(a)
and S2(a) denote the two squares adjacent to a. Let {vi}4i=1
denote the four vertices of the rectangle S1(a) ∪ S2(a). We
then have the following definition.
Definition 6.1 (Open Edge in Ls): An edge a in Ls is said
to be open iff all the following conditions are met:
1) Each square S1(a) and S2(a) adjacent to a has at least
one legitimate node.
2) The region Z(a) is free of eavesdroppers, where Z(a)
is smallest rectangle such that
⋃4
i=1 Bvi(rfree) ⊂ Z(a)
with8
rfree , g
−1
(
2−̺g(
√
5d)− σ
2
P
(1− 2−̺)
)
. (17)
The above definition was chosen such that discrete edge
percolation in L′s can be tied to continuum percolation in
Gstrong, as given by the following two propositions.
8To ensure that rfree in (17) is well-defined, in the rest of the paper we
assume that d is chosen such that d < 1√
5
g−1
(
σ2
P
(2̺ − 1)
)
.
Proposition 6.1 (Two-Square Coupling): If a is an open edge
in Ls, then all legitimate nodes inside S1(a) ∪ S2(a) form a
single connected component in Gstrong.
Proof: If two legitimate nodes x1, x2 are to be placed inside
the region S1(a) ∪ S2(a), the most unfavorable configuration
in terms of MSR is the one where x1 and x2 are on opposite
corners of the rectangle S1(a)∪S2(a) and thus |x1−x2| =
√
5d.
In such configuration, we see from (4) that the edge −−→x1x2
exists in G iff |x1−e∗| > g−1
(
2−̺g(
√
5d)− σ2P (1 − 2−̺)
)
,
rfree, where e∗ is the eavesdropper closest to x1. As a re-
sult, the edge x1x2 exists in Gstrong iff both Bx1(rfree) and
Bx2(rfree) are free of eavesdroppers. Now, if Z(a) is the
smallest rectangle containing the region
⋃4
i=1 Bvi(rfree), the
condition Πe{Z(a)} = 0 ensures the edge xixj exists in Gstrong
for any xi, xj ∈ S1(a)∪S2(a). Thus, all legitimate nodes inside
S1(a)∪S2(a) form a single connected component in Gstrong.
Proposition 6.2 (Component Coupling): If the open compo-
nent in L′s containing the origin is infinite, then the compo-
nent Kstrong(0) is also infinite.
Proof: Consider Fig. 3(c). Let P = {a′i} denote a path of
open edges {a′i} in L′s. By the definition of dual lattice, the
path P uniquely defines a sequence S = {Si} of adjacent
squares in Ls, separated by open edges {ai} (the duals of
{a′i}). Then, each square in S has at least one legitimate node
(by Definition 6.1), and all legitimate nodes falling inside the
region associated with S form a single connected component
in Gstrong (by Proposition 6.1). Now, let KL′s(0) denote the
open component in L′s containing 0. Because of the argument
just presented, we have |KL′s(0)| ≤ |Kstrong(0)|. Thus, if
|KL′s(0)| =∞, then |Kstrong(0)| =∞.
B. Discrete Percolation
Having performed an appropriate mapping from a continuous
to a discrete model, we now analyze discrete edge percolation
in L′s. Let Ns be the number of squares that compose the
rectangle Z(a) introduced in Definition 6.1. We first study the
behavior of paths in Ls with the following proposition.
Proposition 6.3 (Geometric Bound): The probability that a
given path in Ls with length n is closed is bounded by
P{path in Ls with length n is closed} ≤ qn/Ne , (18)
where Ne is a finite integer and
q = 1− (1− e−λℓd2)2 · e−λeNsd2 (19)
is the probability that an edge in Ls is closed.
Proof: (outline) Using Definition 6.1, we can write
q , P{edge a in Ls is closed}
= 1− P{Πℓ{S1(a)} ≥ 1 ∧Πℓ{S2(a)} ≥ 1 ∧ Πe{Z(a)} = 0}
= 1− (1− e−λℓd2)2 · e−λeNsd2 .
Now, let P = {ai}ni=1 denote a path in Ls with length n and
edges {ai}. Even though the edges {ai} do not all have indepen-
dent states (in which case we would have P{P is closed} = qn),
it is possible to show that P{P is closed} ≤ qn/Ne for a
finite integer Ne, by finding a subset Q ⊆ P of edges with
independent states (see [16] for details).
Having obtained a geometric bound on the probability of
a path of length n being closed, we can now use a Peierls
argument to study the existence of an infinite component.9
Proposition 6.4 (Discrete Percolation in L′s): If the proba-
bility q satisfies
q <
(
11− 2√10
27
)Ne
, (20)
then
P{open component in L′s containing 0 is infinite} > 0. (21)
Proof: We start with the key observation that the
open component in L′s containing 0 is finite iff there is
a closed circuit in Ls surrounding 0, as illustrated in
Fig. 3(c). Thus, the inequality in (21) is equivalent to
P{∃ closed circuit in Ls surrounding 0} < 1. Let ρ(n) denote
the possible number of circuits of length n in Ls surrounding 0
(a deterministic quantity). Let κ(n) denote the number of closed
circuits of length n in Ls surrounding 0 (a random variable).
From combinatorial arguments, it can be shown [19, Eq. (1.17)]
that ρ(n) ≤ 4n3n−2. Then, for a fixed n,
P{κ(n) ≥ 1} ≤ ρ(n) · P{path in Ls with length n is closed}
≤ 4n3n−2qn/Ne ,
where we used the union bound and Proposition 6.3. Also,
P{∃ closed circuit in Ls surrounding 0}
= P{κ(n) ≥ 1 for some n}
≤
∞∑
n=1
4n3n−2qn/Ne =
4q1/Ne
3(1− 3q1/Ne)2 , (22)
for q <
(
1
3
)Ne
. We see that if q satisfies (20), then (22) is
strictly less than one, and (21) follows.
We now use the propositions to finalize the proof of
Lemma 4.2, whereby pstrong∞ (λℓ) > 0 for sufficiently large (but
finite) λℓ.
Proof of Lemma 4.2: For any fixed λe, it is easy to
see the probability q in (19) can be made small enough to
satisfy condition (20), by making the edge length d sufficiently
small, and the density λℓ sufficiently large (but finite). For
any such choice of parameters λℓ, λe, d satisfying (20), the
open component in L′s containing 0 is infinite with positive
probability (by Proposition 6.4), and the component Kstrong(0)
is also infinite with positive probability (by Proposition 6.2),
i.e., pstrong∞ (λℓ) > 0.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we obtain additional insights about percolation
in the iS-graph via Monte Carlo simulation. Figure 4 shows the
percolation probabilities for the weak and strong components
of the iS-graph, versus the density λℓ of legitimate nodes.
As predicted by Theorem 4.1, the figure suggests that these
components experience a phase transition as λℓ is increased.
In particular, λweakc ≈ 3.4m−2 and λstrongc ≈ 6.2m−2, for the
case of λe = 1m−2 and ̺ = 0. Operationally, this means that
9A “Peierls argument”, so-named in honour of Rudolf Peierls and his 1936
article on the Ising model [18], refers to an approach based on enumeration.
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Figure 4. Simulated percolation probabilities for the weak and strong compo-
nents of the iS-graph, versus the density λℓ of legitimate nodes (λe = 1m−2,
̺ = 0).
if long-range bidirectional secure communication is desired in
a wireless network, the density of legitimate nodes must be
at least 6.2 times that of the eavesdroppers. In practice, the
density of legitimate nodes must be even larger, because a
secrecy requirement greater than ̺ = 0 is typically required.
This dependence on ̺ is illustrated in Figure 5. In practice, it
might also be of interest to increase λℓ fairly beyond the critical
density, since this leads to an increased average fraction p⋄∞ of
nodes which belong to the infinite component, thus improving
secure connectivity.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Theorem 4.1 shows that each of the four components of the
iS-graph (in, out, weak, and strong) experiences a phase tran-
sition at some nontrivial critical density λ⋄c of legitimate nodes.
Operationally, this implies that long-range communication over
multiple hops is still feasible when a secrecy constraint is
present. We proved that percolation can occur for any prescribed
secrecy threshold ̺ satisfying ̺ < ̺max = log2
(
1 + P ·g(0)σ2
)
,
as long as the density of legitimate nodes is made large enough.
This implies that for unbounded path loss models such as
g(r) = 1/rγ , percolation can occur for any arbitrarily large
secrecy requirement ̺, while for bounded models such as
g(r) = 1/(1 + rγ), the desired ̺ may be too high to allow
percolation. Our results also show that as long as ̺ < ̺max,
percolation can be achieved even in cases where the eavesdrop-
pers are arbitrarily dense, by making the density of legitimate
nodes large enough. Using Monte Carlo simulation, we obtained
numerical estimates for various critical densities. For example,
when ̺ = 0 we estimated that if the density of eavesdroppers is
larger than roughly 30% that of the legitimate nodes, long-range
communication in the weak iS-graph is completely disrupted, in
the sense that no infinite cluster arises. In the strong iS-graph,
we estimated this fraction to be about 16%. For a larger secrecy
requirement ̺, an even more modest fraction of attackers is
enough to disrupt the network. We are hopeful that further
efforts will lead to tight analytical bounds for these critical
densities.
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Figure 5. Effect of the secrecy rate threshold ̺ on the percolation probabil-
ity pweak∞ (λe = 1m−2, g(r) = 1/r4, Pℓ/σ2 = 10).
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